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Pharmacists and the “Morning-After Pill”:
Creating Room for Conscience Behind the Counter
Tony J. Kriesel*
I. INTRODUCTION
A woman walks into her local pharmacy, where she has
been a customer for years, to fill what she believes to be a
routine prescription for birth control. The pharmacist, after
perusing the doctor’s drug choice, takes a deep breath, looks the
customer in the eye, and says, “Sorry, my conscience does not
allow me to fill this. Please take it elsewhere.”
What prompts the pharmacist’s unusual response? Is birth
control no longer legal? Does the Constitution no longer
guarantee the fundamental right to contraception? While such
questions might be racing through the woman’s mind, a closer
look reveals that this is no routine prescription for birth
control. Rather, the doctor prescribed a particular type of drug,
commonly called the “morning-after pill” or “emergency
contraception,” which women take within seventy-two hours of
sexual intercourse to prevent pregnancy beyond administration
of the drug.1
A scientific controversy surrounding the effect of the drug
prompts the pharmacist’s unexpected response: some argue the
drug simply prevents pregnancy, much like a condom or other
ordinary contraception,2 while others, such as the pharmacist
above, believe it terminates a pregnancy, effectively making the
drug an abortion.3 By choosing not to fill the prescription, the
© 2005 Tony J. Kriesel.
* J.D. expected 2006, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. See generally Felicia Stewart, James Trussel & Paul F.A. Van Look,
Emergency Contraception, in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 279-303 (18th rev.
ed. 2004) (describing the history, methods, effectiveness, advantages,
disadvantages, and other issues regarding emergency contraception).
2. See David A. Grimes & Elizabeth G. Raymond, Emergency
Contraception, 137 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. E-180, E-182 (2002).
3. See Stephanie Simon, Illinois Drugstores Required to Fill
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pharmacist exercises her right to not participate in that
procedure.
This scenario has played out in many pharmacies across
the country,4 prompting a variety of political,5 legal,6 and moral
responses.7 Proponents of the customer’s right to free access of
the drug argue the patient’s autonomy as a consumer of drugs
should prevail,8 and the Constitution’s fundamental right to
contraception protects that autonomy.9 In contrast, supporters
of the pharmacist’s right to conscience cite the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment10 and the pharmacist’s
particular role in patient health care.11 Consequently, the
Prescriptions for Contraceptives, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2005, at A15.
4. See Rene Sanchez, New Arena for Birth-Control Battle, STAR TRIB.,
May 3, 2005, at A1, A10 (reporting that while the exact number of emergency
contraception refusals nationwide is unknown, both sides of the debate say it
is happening more often and predict it will increase).
5. See, e.g., Monica Davey & Pam Belluck, Pharmacies Balk on After-Sex
Pill and Widen Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at A1 (stating that some
state legislators are proposing laws that allow pharmacists to refuse filling
prescriptions to which they are opposed, while others are proposing laws that
require pharmacists to dispense any legal prescription for birth control).
6. See, e.g., Eric Noe, Some Pharmacists Have Triggered Legal Battles by
Refusing to Fill Contraceptive Prescriptions, ABC NEWS, May 3, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/LegalCenter/story?id=701109&page=1
(documenting Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich’s directive requiring
pharmacists to dispense any valid prescriptions for the morning-after pill, as
well as the legal challenge against the order).
7. See, e.g., Erik A. McClave, A Catholic Pharmacist’s Struggle,
TCRNEWS, http://tcrnews2.com/pharmacy.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005)
(describing the pharmacist author’s frustration and guilt in dispensing drugs
that are contrary to his religious and moral beliefs).
8. See Stephanie E. Harvey et al., Do Pharmacists Have the Right to
Refuse to Dispense a Prescription Based on Personal Beliefs?, http://www.nmpharmacy.com/body_rights.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
9. See Yuliya Fisher Schaper, Emergency Contraception for Rape
Victims: A New Face of the Old Battleground of Legal Issues in the Bipartisan
Abortion Politics in the United States, 29 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 9 (2005).
10. See Correy E. Stephenson, Health Care Providers Refusing Treatment
Based on Religious Beliefs, KAN. CITY DAILY REC., Apr. 26, 2005, at 1, 2 (“In
this country, we decided from the beginning to respect and accommodate the
free exercise of religion . . . .” (quoting Francis J. Manion, attorney at the
American Center for Law & Justice)).
11. See Hearing on H.B. 2711 Before the S. Public Health & Welfare
Comm.,
2002
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Ks.
2002),
available
at
http://www.pfli.org/PKoch_Testimony_KS_Senate2002.html [hereinafter Koch
testimony] (testimony of Paula Koch) (testifying in support of a bill that would
allow pharmacists to conscientiously object to filling some prescriptions, that
the pharmacist is part of “the health care team” and not simply a “conduit of
the physician’s wishes”).
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controversy becomes a clash of constitutional rights, only one of
which may prevail.
Part II of this article argues that emergency contraception
is an abortion, and the pharmacist is within her right in
denying access to the drug. Part III demonstrates that even if
emergency contraception is not an abortion, there is still no
right to have a prescription for the drug filled at any pharmacy
a woman chooses. Part IV addresses state laws that compel
pharmacists to dispense drugs, regardless of their conscientious
objections. This discussion leads to the conclusion that the
pharmacist may legally and constitutionally refuse to fill a
prescription for emergency contraception.
II. THE PRIMARY AREA OF CONTENTION: IS
EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION AN ABORTION?
Emergency contraception, which is relatively new to the
market,12 operates differently than other types of
contraception. What makes this drug different from a condom
or the birth control pill, and why do some people view
dispensing emergency contraception as equivalent to assisting
in the procurement of an abortion?
A. EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION: A DIFFERENT KIND OF
CONTRACEPTION
The most popular methods of contraception in the United
States are implemented before sexual intercourse, preventing
the fertilization of the woman’s egg.13 In contrast, emergency
12. See Stewart, Trussel & Van Look, supra note 1, at 280 (recounting
that two products, Preven and Plan B, used specifically for emergency
contraception, were approved by the FDA in 1998 and 1999, respectively).
Preven was withdrawn from the market in 2004, making Plan B the sole
emergency contraceptive product. Id.
13. See James Trussell, The Essentials of Contraception: Efficacy, Safety,
and Personal Considerations, in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1,
at 221, 222 (stating that the four most popular contraception methods in the
United States are female sterilization, oral contraceptive pills, male condoms,
and male sterilization). Female sterilization cuts or blocks the fallopian tube,
preventing the sperm and egg from uniting. See Amy E. Pollack, Charles S.
Carignan & Roy Jacobstein, Female and Male Sterilization, in
CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, at 531, 532. Oral pills block the
luteinizing hormone surge, which inhibits ovulation. See Robert A. Hatcher &
Anita Nelson, Combined Hormonal Contraceptive Methods, in CONTRACEPTIVE
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, at 391, 392. The male condom acts as a physical
barrier to prevent the passage of semen. See Lee Warner, Robert A. Hatcher
& Markus J. Steine, Male Condoms, in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra
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contraception is taken after intercourse, when other methods of
contraception were either not used or may not have been
effective.14 Also referred to as the “morning-after pill” and
“postcoital contraception,” “emergency contraception” has
emerged as the preferred medical term, as it prevents the false
impression that it must be taken the morning after sex and
emphasizes that it should not be an ongoing contraception
method.15
Plan B is the only drug currently marketed as emergency
contraception.16 While several other drugs, used in proper
dosages, can have the same effect as Plan B,17 the latter
remains the only drug specifically marketed for “contraceptive
emergencies.”18 To be effective, two doses of the drug must be
taken, the second dose twelve hours after the first.19 While
most studies have shown emergency contraception must be
taken within seventy-two hours of sexual intercourse, the drug
may still be effective for up to 120 hours.20
Depending upon where the woman is in her menstrual
cycle, emergency contraception can have several effects. When
taken prior to ovulation, emergency contraception prevents
fertilization,21 similar to other common forms of contraception.
When taken during ovulation, however, studies have shown the
development of a receptive uterine lining can be altered.22 This
alteration may prevent a fertilized egg from implanting in the
woman’s uterus,23 thereby ending further development of the
egg. It is this effect that concerns abortion opponents.

note 1, at 331, 332. Male sterilization, or vasectomy, blocks the vasa
deferentia, preventing the passage of sperm into the ejaculated seminal fluid.
See Pollack, Carignan & Jacobstein, supra, at 533.
14. See Grimes & Raymond, supra note 2, at E-180.
15. See id.
16. See Stewart, Trussel & Van Look, supra note 1, at 280.
17. See id. at tbl.12-1.
18. Id. Insertion of a copper-releasing intrauterine device (IUD) may also
be used as emergency contraception. See id. at 285-86. It is not, however,
implicated in the current debate upon which this article focuses.
19. See Grimes & Raymond, supra note 2, at E-180 to E-181.
20. See Stewart, Trussel & Van Look, supra note 1, at 285.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
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B. THE BIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR EMERGENCY
CONTRACEPTION’S ABORTIFACIENT EFFECT
Human development begins with the fertilization of the
egg by the sperm.24 At fertilization, embryonic development
begins.25 The term “embryo” describes the first eight weeks of
human development.26 The single cell created by fertilization is
called a zygote,27 which is genetically unique because both
mother and father contribute half the chromosomes that make
up the cell.28 At this point, the gender of the unborn child has
These biological facts support the
been determined.29
contention that pregnancy begins when the egg and sperm
fuse.30
This assertion is contradicted by popular use of the word
“pre-embryo” to describe the period between fertilization and
implantation in the uterus.31 The origin of this term, however,
is less than scientific. First defined in 1986, “pre-embryo” was
initially used in the United States and the United Kingdom for
public policy reasons related to in vitro fertilization.32 The
term was needed to alleviate moral concerns regarding the
status of the fertilized egg prior to implantation in the uterus.33
Prior to 1986, the term “embryo” described the developing
human beginning at the time of conception.34
An abortion is a premature stoppage of the development of
24. See, e.g., BRUCE M. CARLSON, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY AND
DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 2 (2d ed. 1999); KEITH L. MOORE & T.V.N.
PERSAUD, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN: CLINICALLY ORIENTED EMBRYOLOGY 34
(6th ed. 1998); RONAN O’RAHILLY & FABIOLA MÜLLER, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY
AND TERATOLOGY 31 (3d ed. 2001).
25. See CARLSON, supra note 24, at 2; WILLIAM J. LARSEN, HUMAN
EMBRYOLOGY 1 (2d ed. 1997); MOORE & PERSAUD, supra note 24, at 2.
26. See CARLSON, supra note 24, at xv; LARSEN, supra note 25, at xv-xvi.
The term “fetus” is used to describe development from eight weeks to birth.
See CARLSON, supra note 24, at xvi-xvii.
27. MOORE & PERSAUD, supra note 24, at 2.
28. Id. at 37.
29. See CARLSON, supra note 24, at 32; MOORE & PERSAUD, supra note 24,
at 37.
30. See CARLSON, supra note 24, at 2.
31. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1078 (3d ed.
1993).
32. See J.D. Biggers, Arbitrary Partitions of Prenatal Life, 5 HUM.
REPROD. 1, 3-5 (1990) (suggesting the term was used to facilitate a discussion
on the moral status of the “early prenatal human organism”).
33. See id. at 4.
34. Id. at 1.
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the embryo or fetus before viability.35 If one accepts the
medical understanding that pregnancy begins at fertilization,
then when emergency contraception prevents a fertilized egg
from implanting in the uterus, this leads to an abortion.36 This
is the reason why medical doctors have said emergency
contraception can be abortifacient,37 and some state
legislatures have attempted to define abortion as the
termination of a pregnancy anytime after fertilization.38
Moreover, this argument is the reason why pharmacists all
across the country are refusing to fill prescriptions for
emergency contraception.
C. LIMITATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO AN
ABORTION
While it is easy to understand why abortion opponents are
opposed to the use of emergency contraception, supporters of
free access to emergency contraception suggest that such
opposition is legally irrelevant. It is argued that even if the
drug is abortifacient, the Constitution protects a woman’s right
to an abortion.39 To interpret this protection as grounds to
compel pharmacists to provide abortions, however, is to extend
the right too far. The Supreme Court has never suggested the
right to an abortion means a pregnant woman has the right to
receive an abortion from any doctor whom she chooses or at any
35. MOORE & PERSAUD, supra note 24, at 3.
36. See id. at 532.
37. See, e.g., MOORE & PERSAUD, supra note 24, at 532 (“[Morning-after
pills] prevent implantation, not fertilization. . . . [T]hey should not be called
contraceptive pills. Conception occurs but the blastocyst does not implant. . . .
Because the term abortion refers to premature stoppage of a pregnancy, the
term abortion could be applied to such an early termination of a pregnancy.”);
Davey & Belluck, supra note 5, at A16 (“Emergency contraceptive pills can be
abortifacient if they are taken after ovulation has occurred.” (quoting Dr.
Gertrude Murphy, M.D.)).
38. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.1(1) (West 1979) (defining
abortion as “the deliberate termination of a human pregnancy after
fertilization of a female ovum”). In Margaret S. v. Edwards, the plaintiff
argued this definition was impermissibly vague, as it could implicate the
morning-after pill. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 190-91 (E.D.
La. 1980).
39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“[A] right of privacy, whether it
be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty . . . or .
. . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy”); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)
(affirming Roe’s essential holdings).
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clinical setting she might choose. In fact, the Court has
explicitly stated otherwise.
In Doe v. Bolton,40 a companion case to Roe v. Wade,41 a
Georgia statute was challenged that, in part, required a
committee of at least three hospital staff members to approve of
an abortion before the procedure could be administered.42 In
striking down the provision, the Court speculated that the
reason for the provision was, perhaps, to protect the hospital
itself, rather than out of concern for the woman’s need to make
an informed decision.43 In response to the hospital’s speculated
concern, the Court stated, “the hospital is free not to admit a
patient for an abortion. . . . Further a physician or any other
employee has the right to refrain, for moral or religious
reasons, from participating in the abortion procedure.”44
Sixteen years later in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services,45 the Court made an even more direct pronouncement
on an individual’s right not to participate in the abortion
procedure. At issue was a Missouri statute that prohibited any
public employee in the state from performing or assisting in an
abortion, unless the procedure was necessary to save the
mother’s life.46 In upholding the statute, the Court observed:
Missouri’s refusal to allow public employees to perform abortions in
public hospitals leaves a pregnant woman with the same choices as if
the State had chosen not to operate any public hospitals at all. The
challenged provisions only restrict a woman’s ability to obtain an
abortion to the extent that she chooses to use a physician affiliated
with a public hospital.47

In short, a state is not constitutionally required to provide
facilities and physicians for abortions. In the same opinion, the
Court further stated that “[n]othing in the Constitution
requires States to enter or remain in the business of performing
abortions. Nor . . . do private physicians and their patients
have some kind of constitutional right of access to public
facilities for the performance of abortions.”48

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

410 U.S. 179 (1973).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 183-84.
See id. at 197.
Id. at 197-98.
492 U.S. 490 (1989).
Id. at 507.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 510.
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Moreover, the Court has never suggested there is a
constitutional obligation for private doctors or facilities to
provide abortion services. In Doe, the Court did not question
the constitutionality of the Georgia statute provision allowing
all physicians and hospitals, public and private, to refrain from
the abortion procedure.49 Poelker v. Doe,50 decided four years
after Roe and Doe, lends further support to this proposition.
There, the Court upheld a directive by a city mayor to disallow
abortions in the two city hospitals, except when the mother’s
health was in serious danger.51 Justice Brennan, in his
dissent, expressed disapproval toward the ruling, largely due to
his concern that women seeking abortions might not have a
private clinical alternative in some areas of the country, if
similar public hospital bans were in place.52 Again, there was
no suggestion that the Constitution might require private
physicians or facilities to provide abortions, thereby ensuring
access to the procedure. No doctor or hospital, public or
private, then, has the constitutional obligation to participate in
an abortion procedure.
It follows that because emergency contraception may act as
an abortion procedure, there is no constitutional obligation of
any state or private actor to provide access to emergency
contraception.
This makes the drug neither illegal nor
unconstitutional, but it does mean it is constitutionally
permissive for businesses, public and private, as well as
individual pharmacists and employees, to deny emergency
contraception to their customers.
III. THE CONCURRENT LIMITATIONS ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONTRACEPTION
The use of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence to
support the argument that pharmacists have no obligation to
dispense emergency contraception requires that one accept the
premise that emergency contraception is abortifacient. Even if
that premise is rejected, the Court’s jurisprudence outside of
the abortion context still supports the conclusion that
pharmacists are under no obligation to dispense emergency
contraception.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 184, 197-98 (1973).
432 U.S. 519 (1977).
See id. at 520-21.
See id. at 524 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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A. THE COUNTERARGUMENT: EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION IS
ORDINARY CONTRACEPTION
There is no consensus among medical doctors that
pregnancy begins at conception. Instead, some doctors declare
a woman pregnant approximately one week after conception,
when the fertilized egg becomes implanted in the uterus.53
Under this definition, when emergency contraception makes
implantation in the uterus impossible, the pregnancy would be
prevented, rather than terminated. Instead of operating as an
abortion, emergency contraception could not be differentiated
from other types of contraception that prevent pregnancy.
The definitional distinction of pregnancy’s beginning has
been used to argue emergency contraception should not be
Despite the
examined in the abortion framework.54
ramifications that the distinction might have, not the least
being the issue at hand, the Supreme Court has yet to address
when a legal pregnancy begins.55 Lower courts, however, have
made conjectures, favoring the “implantation” view over the
“conception” view.56
B. LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO CONTRACEPTION
Even if emergency contraception is not an abortion, it does
not follow that one has a constitutional right for a prescription
to be filled at any pharmacy of one’s choosing. Although there
is an unquestionable constitutional right for access to
contraception in the United States,57 there is no precedent
suggesting any particular pharmacy or pharmacist is required
by the Constitution to dispense contraception. Griswold v.
Connecticut58 struck down a state law that had forbidden the
53. See, e.g., GRIMES & RAYMOND, supra note 2, at E-182.
54. See Schaper, supra note 9, at 8-9.
55. Id. at 8.
56. See, e.g., Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 190-92 (E.D. La.
1980) (striking down a statute that defined pregnancy as beginning “after
fertilization of the female ovum,” and holding that the definition was
constitutionally vague and might include the morning-after pill); Brownfield v.
Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 208 Cal. App. 3d 405, 408-13 (Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that a Catholic hospital could not refuse to give information on the
morning-after pill, as it did not fit within the scope of abortion).
57. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding a
constitutional right to contraception); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 454-55 (1972) (striking down a Massachusetts statute that denied
contraception access to unmarried individuals).
58. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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use of contraception and any third party assistance in its use,
under the auspices of marital privacy.59 Seven years later, the
Court extended the constitutional right to contraception to
More
include distribution to unmarried individuals.60
instructive than the rights conferred in these cases, however, is
where the Court was silent: no mention was made of any
obligation,
pharmaceutically
or
otherwise,
to
carry
contraceptive devices. In short, one has a right to buy
contraception so long as there is a location from which to buy it.
The Constitution protects access, not accessibility.
The third pertinent Supreme Court decision regarding the
sale and purchase of contraception is the 1977 case, Carey v.
Population Services International.61 There, a New York law
permitted only licensed pharmacists to distribute or sell
nonprescription contraceptives.62 In striking down the law, the
Court was concerned with the “restriction of distribution
channels to a small fraction of the total number of possible
retail outlets render[ing] contraceptive devices considerably
less accessible to the public.”63 Although a cursory glance at
the cited language might suggest the Court would uphold a law
forcing pharmacies to sell emergency contraception, as it would
allow for greater access, such an interpretation takes the ruling
out of context.
The plaintiff in Carey was a mail order retailer of
contraception.64 By granting the retailer the right to sell in
New York, the Court broadened access by lifting a prohibition
on entry into the market. Contextually, protecting the rights of
retailers to choose to sell contraception is much different than
requiring retailers to sell a particular form of contraception.
This latter scenario, parallel to the course suggested by
emergency contraception access advocates, grossly perverts the
constitutional right to contraception beyond its true scope. The
constitutional right prevents the state from restricting one’s
access to contraception. This right falls short of mandating any
particular retailer, including a pharmacy, to sell the products.
IV. SHIFTING THE CONTROVERSY: STATE-MANDATED
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 485.
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 441-43.
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
Id. at 681.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 682 n.2.
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DISPENSATION
Even if the Constitution grants no right to emergency
contraception access, the legitimate arguments for free
accessibility remain. Most fundamentally, a pharmacist’s
refusal to provide a legal prescription for a drug burdens the
patient-doctor relationship, in which patients are able to
control their health care decisions.65 Moreover, specific to the
drug in controversy, expedient access is critical when the drug’s
effectiveness decreases seventy-two hours after intercourse. In
geographic areas with few drugstores, a woman denied access
to emergency contraception in one pharmacy may be completely
denied of the opportunity to use the drug altogether.66 Perhaps
more worrisome, among the many victims of rape who may
become pregnant each year in the United States, barriers to
emergency contraception access would require such victims to
choose more intrusive methods for dealing with a pregnancy.67
In response to these concerns and the probable lack of a
constitutional right to guaranteed access to emergency
contraception, state legislatures have attempted to exercise
their own powers to compel access to the drug by enacting
“must-dispense” laws.68
A. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V.
SMITH
These “must-dispense” laws have their own constitutional
ramifications.
For instance, many pharmacists refuse to
dispense emergency contraception due to religious beliefs.69
For those who accept emergency contraception as abortifacient,
religious teachings in opposition to abortion create conflict.70
65. See Susan Berke Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Saving Roe Is Not
Enough: When Religion Controls Healthcare, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 725, 72728 (2004).
66. See Sanchez, supra note 4, at A10 (reporting the concerns of Sarah
Stoesz, president of Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, North Dakota, and
South Dakota).
67. See Schaper, supra note 9, at 4-5.
68. See Davey & Belluck, supra note 5, at A16 (reporting that California,
Missouri, and New Jersey each had such proposals). In addition, similar bills
had been proposed on the federal level, in both the House and the Senate. Id.
69. See Mike Rutledge, Pharmacist Sues over Abortion Pill, CINCINNATI
POST, Aug. 13, 1999, at 1A, 10A.
70. Some religions explicitly oppose abortion. For some Christians, the
following verse is cited: “Before I formed you in the womb I knew you. [B]efore
you were born I dedicated you . . . .” Jeremiah 1:5 (St. Joseph). For Roman
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Indeed, cooperation in an abortion may even lead to
excommunication in the Roman Catholic Church.71 Such
conflict with religion implicates the free exercise clause of the
First Amendment, which prohibits laws that impede the free
exercise of religion.72
The Supreme Court established the framework for free
exercise challenges in Employment Division v. Smith.73 The
Court proclaimed the “mere possession of religious or religious
convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political
society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of
political responsibilities.”74 The Court held that the “right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that
his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”75
On the face of the Smith standard, the conscientious
pharmacist’s argument seems to fail. A law that requires
dispensation of valid prescriptions for emergency contraception
is “neutral” in the sense that it is presumably not written in
animus toward a specific group of pharmacists, and it is of
“general applicability” because it applies to all pharmacists,
regardless of religious belief. Instead, the impetus behind the
law is to ensure access to the drug.76
Catholics, “[h]uman life must be respected and protected from the moment of
conception. From the first moment of existence, a human being must be
recognized as having the rights of a person – among which is the inviolable
right of every innocent being to life.” CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH:
WITH MODIFICATIONS FROM THE EDITIO TYPICA 606 (Doubleday 1997) (1994).
Islam also explicitly opposes abortion. See Hassan Hathout, Abortion –
Contraception
–
Sterilization
3-5
(2002),
http://www.eufobio.org/~upload/religion/texte/Islam_abortion.pdf
(providing
Islamic teachings on abortion, including that the act is a sin, meriting punitive
measures).
71. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 70, at 606.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the First
Amendment).
73. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
74. Id. at 879.
75. Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
76. See Dirk Johnson & Hilary Shenfeld, Swallowing a Bitter Pill in
Illinois, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 25, 2005, at 28 (reporting that Illinois Governor
Blagojevich, after issuing an edict requiring pharmacists to dispense
emergency contraception, stated that his reason was to enable women to fill
birth control prescriptions quickly and without hassle).

KRIESEL_FINAL

2005]

01/09/2006 12:42:18 PM

CONSCIENCE BEHIND THE COUNTER

349

The Smith Court, however, articulated an exception to the
standard to account for previous cases that struck down
seemingly neutral and generally applicable laws that
encroached on the free exercise clause.77 In defining the socalled “hybrid” exception,78 the Court said the First
Amendment only bars neutral, generally applicable laws that
implicate the “[f]ree [e]xercise [c]lause in conjunction with
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and
of the press.”79 Thus, in order to challenge the must-dispense
law on the basis of the Smith standard, a pharmacist must
state a constitutional claim in addition to the free exercise
violation.
The First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause80 is the
most viable argument. The Court has interpreted the freedom
of speech to include expressive conduct.81 A pharmacist who
refuses to fill a prescription may be expressing many ideas
through her conduct, including the belief that emergency
contraception is abortifacient, as well as the more general belief
that abortion is morally wrong.
Withholding the drug,
however, is not conduct, but rather refraining from conduct.
And, in Wooley v. Maynard,82 the Supreme Court stated that
“the First Amendment . . . includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. . . . The
right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of the broader concept of
‘individual freedom of mind.’”83
Even if the refusal to dispense emergency contraception
constitutes speech, the plaintiff pharmacist must still raise a
viable freedom of speech claim in order to challenge a must77. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121 (1990) (speculating that the reason for
the exception was to distinguish Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in
which the Court discussed the constitutional right to direct the religious
upbringing of their children, as well as the free exercise clause).
78. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
79. Id. at 881. The federal courts of appeals have split on how the hybrid
exception should be applied. See Jonathan B. Hensley, Comment Approaches
to the Hybrid-Rights Doctrine in Free Exercise Cases, 68 TENN. L. REV. 119,
128-37 (2000).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
81. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989); see also R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
82. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
83. Id. at 714 (1977) (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
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dispense law. First, for conduct to be protected under the First
Amendment, it must be communicative.84 The Supreme Court
has promulgated a two factor inquiry for communicative
conduct: intent to convey a particularized message and
likelihood that the message will be understood by those
receiving it.85 This analysis will be factually dependent upon
the individual pharmacist who withholds a prescription for
emergency contraception. In a First Amendment claim, she
would have to prove both that she intended to let the customer
know that, in her opinion, emergency contraception is morally
wrong, and, second, that it is likely the customer understood
why the drug was denied.
If the conduct is found to be communicative, a state may
still regulate the conduct if it has sufficient justification. The
Court allows incidental limitations on those First Amendment
freedoms if the government articulates a sufficiently important
interest.86 The state has an important interest in ensuring
some access to contraception for women,87 and in the context of
emergency contraception, the state might argue this is
particularly true for victims of rape. The restriction on the
First Amendment freedom implementing the state’s interest,
however, must be no greater than is essential to further that
interest.88 Accordingly, a plaintiff pharmacist might argue that
the scope of a must-dispense law should contemplate the
availability of other pharmacists within the plaintiff’s
pharmacy, as well as other pharmacies within a geographical
region, that might alleviate the need for the plaintiff to
dispense emergency contraception.
A must-dispense law that requires a conscientious
pharmacist to distribute emergency contraception, then,
appears to be at least a candidate for a hybrid claim under the
Smith framework.89 The result of such a claim, however, has
84. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).
85. See id. at 410-11.
86. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
87. A state, for example, may not pass a law prohibiting the sale of
contraceptives, as it would impinge upon the freedom to choose contraception.
See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687-88 (1977). Therefore, it
is likely both within the constitutional power of the state, as well as an
important governmental interest, to ensure women have access to
contraceptives.
88. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
89. But see McConnell, supra note 77, at 1121-22 (opining that the
exception was articulated by the Court only to distinguish Yoder and was not
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become difficult to predict, as the Supreme Court has neither
clarified the hybrid exception since its original pronouncement,
nor granted certiorari to a case whose outcome depended upon
the doctrine.90 This ambiguity has resulted in a split in the
federal circuit courts of appeals, ranging from not recognizing
hybrid claims at all, to requiring an independently viable
constitutional claim when invoked.91
It is far from clear whether a pharmacist challenging a
must-dispense law could succeed. This is not to suggest there
are no further protections for conscientious pharmacists, but it
could mean reliance on the legislative branch rather than the
judiciary.
B. LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES
In a state that passes a must-dispense law, pharmacists
opposed to emergency contraception still have legislative
recourse. In Smith, the Court acknowledged that political
accommodations could be made for religious groups that would
otherwise be subject to a neutral law of general applicability.92
Furthermore, in a jurisdiction that has not passed a mustdispense law, legislation can be enacted to protect pharmacists
who are conscientious objectors. So-called “conscience clauses”
or “refusal clauses”93 grant a pharmacist legal permission to
refuse to dispense a drug that violates her conscience.94 Four
meant to be taken seriously in future cases).
90. See Hensley, supra note 79, at 119, 127-28 (citing the only two
Supreme Court cases that mentioned the doctrine, Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), and City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), neither of which clarified its application).
91. Compare Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993)
(calling the hybrid exception “illogical” because if there is an independent
viable constitutional claim, then there is no need to combine it with an
inviable free exercise claim) with EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,
467 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 68
F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (recognizing the possibility of hybrid claims). See
generally Hensley, supra note 79, at 128-37.
92. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). To
illustrate, the Court cited states that chose to except the sacramental use of
peyote from their drug restrictions. Id.
93. See Fogel & Rivera, supra note 65, at 727.
94. For example, the American Pharmacists Association wrote the
following clause: “APhA recognizes the individual pharmacist’s right to
exercise conscientious refusal and supports the establishment of systems to
ensure patient access to legally prescribed therapy without compromising the
pharmacist’s right of conscientious refusal.” AMERICAN PHARMACISTS ASS’N,
REPORT OF THE 2004 SESSION OF THE APHA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 4 (2004),
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states have already passed these clauses in some form, and
there are legislative proposals in at least twelve other states.95
Conscience clauses, in other forms, have been upheld
against establishment clause challenges in the past.96 A
further benefit for conscientious pharmacists is that conscience
clauses are not explicitly religious, allowing pharmacists
without a free exercise claim to cite their clinical role as part of
the “health care team” as a reason to withhold dispensation of
emergency contraception.97 Such pharmacists believe they are
jointly responsible, with the prescribing physician, for every
prescription dispensed; similar to physicians, then, these
pharmacists argue that they should receive full protection of
the law, even when exercising their moral and ethical
convictions.98
V. CONCLUSION
Despite compelling policy arguments on both sides of the
emergency contraception debate, it appears constitutional law
favors the pharmacist’s conscientious objection to dispensing
emergency contraception.
Whether or not emergency
contraception is considered abortifacient, the Constitution in no
way demands emergency contraception to be available at any
retail drug store the consumer chooses.
Consequently,
supporters of forced drug access cannot rely on the
Constitution.
The viability of a legislative alternative is also in doubt.
Until the Supreme Court clarifies the hybrid exception
articulated in Smith, must-dispense laws will remain
susceptible to free exercise challenges. In that case, the
likelihood of having a prescription filled will depend not only
http://www.aphanet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/Co
ntentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=2472.
95. See Davey & Belluck, supra note 5.
96. See, e.g., Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308, 31012 (9th Cir. 1974) (upholding a federal law that prohibited courts from using a
hospital’s receipt of federal money as a justification for requiring those
hospitals to perform sterilizations that conflicted with their religious beliefs).
97. See Koch testimony, supra note 11 (“Pharmacists have worked very
hard to be considered partner’s in the health care team.”); Noe, supra note 6
(“You don’t need a pharmacist at all if you’re going to just require them to
dispense medications. That takes away their clinical role.” (quoting Susan
Winckler, Vice President of Policy and Communications for the American
Pharmacists Association)).
98. See Koch testimony, supra note 11.
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upon state law and the individual pharmacist, but also upon
each respective circuit’s recognition of the hybrid exception.
The constitutionality of conscience clauses, where passed, is
less in doubt, providing assurance for conscientious
pharmacists in those states.
Undoubtedly controversial and contentious, the debate
between free access to emergency contraception and the
pharmacist’s conscientious objection will continue to incite
litigants, lawmakers, and lobbyists. Pharmacists may take
solace in the debate’s legal implications, however, for there is,
indeed, room for conscience behind the counter.

